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times, they play a direct role in pain. However, it is not true that they are necessary in the more 
important sense that pain is never possible in humans without them. There are additional details 
from human lesion studies concerning functional plasticity that undermine Key’s (2016) 
interpretation. Moreover, no one has yet identified any specific behaviors that mammalian 
cortical pain regions make possible that are absent in fish. 
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Key’s (2016) target article, “Why fish do not feel pain” is the strongest yet in a series of recent 
papers arguing that fish are incapable of consciously experiencing pain. Key does an excellent 
job bringing a wide range of evidence from the neurosciences to bear on the challenging 
question of consciousness in other species. Nevertheless, I think his conclusion oversteps the 
available evidence and fails to address adequately the contrary evidence provided by lesions to 
cortical areas involved in pain in humans.  
 
Key claims that the cortex is both “necessary and sufficient for the feeling of pain in humans.” 
Before delving further into the evidence, it is worth noting that there are different ways in 
which a brain region might be “necessary” for the feeling of pain in humans. On one 
interpretation, when we say that “region X is necessary for pain” what we mean is that, at a 
particular point in time, if region X is prevented from performing its usual activities, pain will not 
be possible. But on a stronger notion of “necessary,” saying “region X is necessary for pain” 
means that at any point in time for a human, if region X is prevented from performing its usual 
activities, pain will not be possible. 
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Like Key, I have argued that there is good evidence that certain cortical regions are necessary for 
pain in the former, weaker, sense of necessity (Shriver 2006, 2016).  As Key notes, there is 
ample evidence from lesion studies — bolstered by single-unit recording, direct stimulation, and 
fMRI — that the primary somatosensory cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the insula 
cortex all play a central role in humans’ typical experiences of pain, and that interfering with 
their functioning will selectively impair aspects of painful experience. Since studies have shown 
that impairing these areas in other mammals results in behaviors that indicate a similar lack of 
pain (Allen 2005, Shriver 2006), I believe the argument for pain in other species is strongest 
when it is directed at other mammals, since they have the same core brain regions involved in 
the experience of pain as humans.  
 
But although the argument is strongest for mammals in virtue of shared cortical areas, it is a 
mistake to conclude that other species lack the conscious experience of pain in virtue of lacking 
those same cortical areas. This is because, despite the fact that certain cortical regions appear to 
be “necessary for pain” at particular times for humans, lesion studies indicate that there are no 
cortical areas that are always necessary for the conscious experience of pain, even in humans. 
 
To his credit, Key discusses all of the studies that provide the evidence supporting his argument. 
However, I believe he pays insufficient attention to important details of the studies that 
ultimately undermine his argument. Since I take it that it has been sufficiently established that 
new pains are possible even after lesions to the anterior cingulate cortex (Davis et al. 2014), and 
that both lesion studies (Ploner et al. 1999) and anatomical evidence (direct spinothalamic 
pathways to affective brain regions) show that the primary somatosensory cortex is not 
required for the unpleasantness of pain, I will focus my arguments on Key’s discussion of the 
lesion studies involving the insula cortex, an important region involved in pain affect in 
mammals.  
 
The two most discussed recent lesion studies involving the insula are those of Damasio et al. 
(2013) and Feinstein et al. (2015). Both examine patients with extensive bilateral damage to the 
insula cortex who report that they still experience pain. A natural interpretation of these results 
is that the insula is not necessary for the experience of pain in these patients. Key resists this 
conclusion, however, by arguing several points: (1) we can’t be sure in any of the cases that the 
insula was completely obliterated, and other evidence has suggested that even highly damaged 
areas of the cortex can still play a functional role in cognitive processes; (2) two other studies by 
Berthier et. al (1987, 1988) have shown that damage to the insula does interfere with the 
experience of pain; (3) the authors failed to obtain fMRI evidence showing that the insula was 
not active during pain; and finally and most importantly: (4) even if the insula was damaged, 
other cortical regions were intact and might therefore still be necessary for pain. 
 
Regarding (1) and (2), it is worth noting that Key is holding the Damasio et al. and Feinstein et al. 
studies to standards that are not met by the Berthier studies. All the patients with pain 
asymbolia described by Berthier et al. (1987, 1988) had unilateral lesions only (that is, lesions to 
the insular cortex in one hemisphere), whereas the more recent studies both involved bilateral 
lesions (lesions to the insular cortex in both hemispheres). The insula lesions in Damasio et al. 
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and Feinstein et al. were far more extensive than those reported in Berthier’s studies. If it were 
the case that all lesions involving a certain amount of damage to the insula, or lesions to a 
particular subdomain of the insula, reliably prevented the experience of pain, that would be a 
strong argument for the role of the insula. What we are left with, however, is a much weaker 
and more complicated body of evidence: Sometimes damage to the insula interferes with the 
experience of pain, and sometimes even greater damage to the insula does not; it is not entirely 
clear what the explanation for the discrepancy is (but see below for one possible explanation). 
Thus, the insula lesion studies, considered together, do not seem to be strong support for the 
claim that the insula is necessary for the experience of pain. 
 
As noted in (3) above, Key also criticized the Damasio et al. and Feinstein et al. studies for failing 
to use fMRI to confirm that the insula was not active during noxious stimulation. However, a 
study from Robert Coghill’s lab (Starr et al. 2009) did just that, and in fact should clearly be 
included alongside the Damasio and Feinstein studies based on what was reported. The Starr et 
al. studies examined patients with unilateral lesions to the insula who were hence more like the 
ones in the Berthier studies than those in the recent studies involving more extensive damage. 
However, the researchers performed fMRI on the patients during noxious stimulation of the side 
of the body contralateral to the lesion and found that not only were the patients still able to 
report on both the sensory and affective components of pain during long-duration noxious 
stimulation, but the patients also exhibited “no detectable activity in either the contralateral or 
ipsilateral insular cortex” during brain imaging (p. 2690). Thus, the insula lesion study that did 
use fMRI during noxious stimulation confirmed that the insula was not playing a role despite the 
patients’ reports of pain.  
 
From this, Starr et al. concluded that “insular activation, although frequently observed in studies 
of pain, may not be necessary to elicit a conscious pain experience,” (p. 2691). Moreover, they 
also noted that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the somatosensory cortex showed 
increased activation in the patients with insula lesions and that this “may suggest increased 
burden on the remaining neural networks to process nociceptive information in the face of 
insular damage,” (p. 2690). This suggests one possible answer to the previous question about 
why some patients with insula lesions lack aspects of painful experience while others do not: the 
brain can rewire after certain lesions so that processes that were previously performed in one 
brain region can later be performed in different regions. The differences in pain behavior 
between patients with insula lesions might be due to the fact that the brains of some of the 
patients with insula lesions have rewired in a way that allows other brain regions to process 
affective pain information. Thus, at a particular point in time, it may be true that damaging a 
person’s insula would result in that person being incapable of feeling the unpleasantness of 
pain. However, it might also be true that, given enough time for the brain to adapt and 
reorganize, the person could later feel pain that is mediated by different brain regions that fulfill 
the role of the insula. The insula may thus be “necessary for pain” in the weaker sense, but not 
“necessary for pain” in the stronger sense — the sense that is more relevant to the question of 
whether animals without insular cortices could be capable of feeling pain.  
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Since the two areas that appear to have compensated for the insula damage in Starr et al. study 
are both cortical, this leads us directly to Key’s final criticism of the lesion study responses: (4) 
that other cortical regions might be responsible for pain even when the insula is impaired. One 
could argue that even though no one particular cortical region is necessary for pain, it is 
nevertheless only cortical regions (or “structurally similar” regions) that are able to play the role 
in pain typically occupied by the insula. Key seems to endorse this idea when he writes that even 
if it were true that pain is possible with the loss of the whole insula, all this would show is that 
“the network of brain regions associated with pain can function when one, or more, of its nodes 
are lost.” An alternative hypothesis, of course, is that since no particular cortical region is 
necessary for pain, non-cortical regions can play a role in non-mammalian species similar to the 
one that cortical regions play in pain perception in mammals. How can we decide between 
these possibilities? 
 
My suggestion is to examine whether there are any behaviors that cortical pain regions enable 
that are not present in other, non-mammalian species. Many nonhuman studies of pain have 
been criticized for relying on measures such as paw withdrawal, tail flicks, and vocalizations that 
do not appear to require the conscious experience of pain; these studies have had a poor track 
record predicting the clinical efficacy of various analgesics (Vierk et al. 2008). Many researchers 
have accordingly argued that better predictions of human pain can be found using conditioned 
place aversion tasks, which require the animal to learn to avoid areas associated with painful 
stimuli (Vierk et al. 2008, Roughan et al. 2013, Gregory et al. 2013). These findings have been 
crucial for understanding the significance of various cortical areas in painful experience; just as 
humans with lesions to the anterior cingulate or insula cortices or those given certain doses of 
morphine will report feeling pain but no longer finding it unpleasant, mammals with lesions to 
these areas who are given opiates will still show some pain behavior but will no longer choose 
to avoid areas where they previously received noxious stimulation (Shriver 2015). Thus, 
conditioned place aversion appears to be one of the best measures of pain behavior in 
nonhuman animal models. 
 
Of course it would be a mistake to assume that there’s something magical about conditioned 
place aversion that facilitates conscious experience, but we can further drill down by noting that 
certain forms of aversive conditioning appear to require conscious awareness while others do 
not. Clark and Squire (1998), for example, found that trace conditioning required conscious 
awareness, whereas delay conditioning did not (Allen 2004). A recent paper by Descalzi et al. 
(2012) found that the synaptic potentiation of the anterior cingulate, one of the crucial cortical 
areas involved in pain affect, mediated trace conditioning in response to noxious stimuli.  
 
So where does this leave us with regard to the previous two options?  Birds, reptiles, and fish 
are all capable of conditioned place aversion. Given that (1) the best model we have for pain in 
nonhuman mammals involves a behavior that is shared with fish and that (2) no other behaviors 
appear to be made possible exclusively by mammalian pain circuitry, I suggest that this pushes 
us toward the interpretation that other brain regions can and do play the same role in non-
mammalian species that the cingulate and insula play in mammals. Unless we think that the 
conscious experience of pain is epiphenomenal (i.e., causally superfluous), a strong argument 
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would be needed to show that conscious pain makes certain behaviors possible in mammals 
that are not possible in other species.  
 
Of course, the cingulate and insula are involved in some processes in mammals that have no 
equivalent in other species, and Key makes the case that neural structures that enable signal 
amplification and global integration are required for consciousness. But since there is certainly 
no deductive argument that can take us from signal amplification or global integration to qualia, 
the claims about their importance are based primarily on research correlating them with self-
reports about conscious experience. But even these correlations (as Seth, 2016, notes in his 
commentary) do not seem to be as robust as was originally supposed. Moreover, when it comes 
to pain specifically, it does not appear that these brain regions are making possible any 
particular form of behavior that is unavailable to other vertebrates. Given the adaptive 
importance of avoiding life- and tissue-threatening features of the environment, it certainly 
would be strange if the ability to experience injury consciously as pain resulted in no new 
behavioral responses to injury. 
 
Perhaps there are important properties of the brain regions that mediate conditioned place 
aversion and other pain behaviors of non-mammalian species that would lead us to conclude 
that these are fundamentally different processes in mammals. But we currently do not know 
anything about those mechanisms that would warrant such a conclusion. Given the similarity of 
behavior, and the lack of a clear, unique role of cortical processes in pain, I think the evidence 
currently points to the (cautious) conclusion that cortical areas involved in pain, though 
necessary in one sense, are actually elaborations of similar processes in other species, rather 
than processes that should be thought of as fundamentally different in kind. As such, there is no 
reason to believe particular cortical regions or indeed the entire cortex to be necessary for pain 
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